South East Water Firms Lost 127.97 Billion Litres to Leaks in a Year — Targets Missed, Fines Paid, Customers Still Left Short

“Water is the driving force of all nature.” – Leonardo Da Vinci

“Thousands have lived without love, not one without water.” – W.H.Auden

Fresh water isn’t a “nice-to-have” service. It is the thin, fragile margin between normal life and instant chaos: hospitals, schools, farming, basic hygiene, firefighting, cooking, industry — all of it depends on water arriving reliably.

So here’s the awkward bit: in 2024/25 (the year to 31 March 2025 in these reports), three regional water companies reported leakage that — when translated into human language — looks less like “operational challenge” and more like a controlled demolition of treated drinking water.

The leakage numbers (2024/25)

From the companies’ own reporting:

• Affinity Water: 148.1 million litres per day (Ml/d) (target 144.9 Ml/d or less) 

• South East Water: total annual leakage 104.79 Ml/d (also reported as “actual leakage” 104.8 Ml/d; target 81.0 Ml/d)

• Southern Water: leakage 97.7 Ml/d (regulatory end-of-year target 94.4 Ml/d)

“Figure 1 shows what each company reported as its average daily leakage in 2024/25. This is the simplest ‘at-a-glance’ comparison: how much treated water was leaking away each day.”

But daily numbers are still hard to picture. To understand the scale, we need to convert those daily losses into the volume wasted over a full year.

The scale, in plain English

Using the standard “Olympic swimming pool” approximation (50m × 25m × 2m ≈ 2.5 million litres), the combined leakage across the three companies is:

• 350.59 million litres every day (350.59 Ml/d)

• 127.97 billion litres a year (≈ 28.15 billion UK gallons, 33.80 billion US gallons)

• 51,186.14 Olympic pools per year — about 4,265.51 pools per month, 140.24 pools per day

(Those totals come directly from multiplying the reported Ml/d by 365 for the year, then converting litres/pools.)

And if you want the full, absurd visual: line up 51,186 Olympic pools end-to-end (each 50 metres long) and you get 2,559 km. That’s a touch longer than the straight-line flight distance from London to Istanbul (~2,505 km)

So no, it doesn’t “go around the world”. But it does go most of the way from London to Istanbul — made entirely of water that was treated, pumped, and then politely escorted into the ground.

Bewl Water: the Kent yardstick

Bewl Water’s capacity is about 31,000 megalitres — i.e., ~31 billion litres.

Against that:

• 127.97 billion litres/year is about 4.13 × Bewl Water in a single year

• That’s 0.34 Bewl Water per month, or 0.011 Bewl Water per day

• In other words: at this leakage scale, you’re looking at the equivalent of draining one full Bewl Water about every 88 days (purely through leakage).

How many Kent homes could that water have supplied?

Another way to translate “127.97 billion litres” into something people can feel is to ask a simple question: how many homes could that volume have supplied in Kent?

To keep it transparent, this uses standard public assumptions:

• Average daily water use in England in 2024–25: 136.5 litres per person per day.

• Kent (2021 Census): 648,393 households, average household size 2.39 people.

That implies an average Kent household uses about:

136.5 × 2.39 ≈ 326 litres per day (roughly).

On that basis, the 127.97 billion litres leaked (across the three companies in 2024/25) is enough to supply about:

• ~1.07 million Kent-sized homes for a full year, or

• every household in Kent for about 1.66 years (roughly 19.9 months, about 605 days).

A necessary caveat: these companies’ supply areas extend beyond Kent, so this is a scale comparison, not a claim that all that lost water was “Kent water”. The point is the magnitude: the leakage volume is large enough to cover Kent household demand for a very long time.

Company-by-company (2024/25)

Converted into annual totals:

• Affinity Water: ~54.06 billion litres/year ≈ 21,622.6 Olympic pools/year ≈ 1.74 Bewl Waters/year

• South East Water: ~38.25 billion litres/year ≈ 15,299.3 Olympic pools/year ≈ 1.23 Bewl Waters/year

• Southern Water: ~35.66 billion litres/year ≈ 14,264.2 Olympic pools/year ≈ 1.15 Bewl Waters/year

Targets missed… and the “punishments” that don’t punish

If you’re a customer, you might assume: miss targets → big consequences → behaviour changes.

In reality, it’s more like: miss targets → financial adjustment → business model absorbs it.

All three companies show target pressure:

• Affinity: 148.1 vs 144.9 Ml/d (missed target by 3.2 Ml/d) 

• South East Water: 104.8 vs 81.0 Ml/d (Missed Target by 23.8 Ml/d)

• Southern: 97.7 vs 94.4 Ml/d (Missed Target by 3.3 Ml/d)

South East Water’s own regulatory accounts spell it out in pounds: they report a net penalty of £12.8m, with the largest component (£8.3m) coming from leakage.

Southern Water says it incurred a £5.3m penalty linked to its three-year average leakage performance. 

Now the satire writes itself: in a normal job, repeatedly losing the product would be called failure. In monopoly-waterland it becomes a “revenue adjustment mechanism” — the corporate equivalent of telling the public: “Don’t worry, we’ve fined ourselves. Please continue paying.”

And yes, there’s a serious point behind the joke: Ofwat’s system often applies performance incentives via allowed revenue adjustments, sometimes with a time lag, which makes them forecastable and easier to “manage” financially rather than fear existentially.

“They paid dividends instead of fixing pipes” — careful: it’s more complicated (and more damning)

There’s a popular story: leaks happened because money went to dividends, not infrastructure.

The sector-wide criticism is real (and Parliament and ministers have made versions of it in plain terms).

But for these three companies in 2024/25, the reports complicate the picture:

• Affinity Water says it paid no equity dividends in 2024/25 and describes shareholder returns as being “reinvested” through the AMP7 period.

• South East Water states no dividend was distributed for the year ended 31 March 2025 (and none by its immediate holding company).

• Southern Water says it has paid no dividends to external shareholders since 2017.

So the sharper criticism — the one that survives contact with the paperwork — is this:

Even without dividends in 2024/25, the system still allowed (and financially “processed”) the loss of ~127.97 billion litres of treated water across just three companies. Which rather suggests the problem isn’t merely where the money went last year — it’s whether the regulatory framework has been designed to make stopping leakage non-negotiable, rather than merely priced-in.

Leakage is the slow emergency. Outages are the fast one.

Leakage is the chronic bleed. Supply failures are the acute shock. And the South East has experienced both.

• In December 2025, a major incident around Tunbridge Wells drew national and regulatory attention; the Drinking Water Inspectorate confirmed it was investigating.

• South East Water issued and later lifted a boil water notice for Tunbridge Wells and surrounding areas (updates remain on its site).

• On 12 January 2026, news outlets reported a major incident affecting large numbers of households across Kent and Sussex after severe weather-related disruption.

Local commentary has also fused leakage, outages, ownership and executive pay into a single trust crisis.

What this means for the public

If you live in the South East, you’re usually told the story in two chapters: (1) your bill and (2) occasional disruption.

But the leakage figures tell the bigger story: a continuous, industrial-scale loss of treated water — enough in 2024/25 (for just these three companies) to equal:

• 51,186 Olympic swimming pools a year

• ~4.13 Bewl Waters a year

• A 2,559 km “pool chain” — roughly London to Istanbul, made of water that never reached a tap

In a region where hosepipe bans, drought warnings, and emergency supply events are now familiar characters in the local news, it’s hard to escape the central question:

If water is life, why does the system tolerate losing it at this scale — year after year — and calling it “performance management”?

The Shepway Vox Team

Dissent is NOT a Crime