Madeira Walk Landslide: Folkestone Leas Playground Cliff Stabilisation Cost Rises to £400,000

Madeira Walk was shut on 29 February 2024 because the ground above Folkestone’s Lower Leas playground looked as if it might go. Two days later, on 2 March, it did: the cliff face behind the play towers slipped. Since then, the fence line has been a constant reminder that this is not just a scenic promenade; it is a live slope above a busy family park.

Engineers brought in by the council describe the risk, if the playground stays, as “intolerable and unacceptable”. That phrase matters. It means the hazard is not something to be “managed” with a few cones and a warning sign. It means the location and the users — children, parents, schools, visitors — make the consequences too severe to leave to chance.

This is the story of what failed, what the reports say, and why the money set aside for fixing it has already grown significantly.

The council’s technical papers place the failure at the edge of a public space most towns would be proud of: a clifftop walk with a major children’s playground directly below. The sequence is set out plainly. Distress was noticed along the path and railings at Madeira Walk near a structure known as The Vinery. Repairs were carried out, but cracking returned and the fence leaned seaward. On 2 March 2024, the slope failed. Sections of the footpath and the toe of the slope were cordoned off.

The consultants’ description of the slip explains why the closure mattered. They interpret it as a shallow translational landslide: the upper layer of loosened material slides across a weaker surface beneath it, rather like a rug slipping on a smooth floor. This sort of failure can happen quickly, and it can recur if water keeps getting into the same plane of weakness.

Rain is not background scenery in these reports; it is a driver. The cliff material is described as loose sand with occasional sandstone blocks, vegetation and a weathered surface layer. During very wet periods, water can soak into that layer, making it heavier and reducing the friction that holds it in place. The report refers to “porewater pressure” — water trapped in tiny spaces between grains — which pushes particles apart and makes sliding easier. Add storm winds acting on trees and the ground can move.

Children are at the centre of the risk assessment, not as rhetoric but as reality. The options work explicitly considers that children have less ability to recognise danger and move away quickly. That is why the authors classify the risk, assuming the playground remains, as “intolerable and unacceptable” without mitigation. “Mitigation” is simply the set of measures that reduces risk to an acceptable level.

A wider visual assessment along The Leas and the Road of Remembrance reinforces that this is not a one-off freak event. It notes landslides tend to occur during or after heavy rainfall and storm conditions, as shallow soils loosen and slip surfaces form. It lists warning signs residents will recognise: cracking or subsidence of footpaths, leaning railings, tilting trees, exposed roots, and changes in retaining walls. It recommends monitoring, especially before, during and after heavy rain. In plain English: the cliff gives clues, and the clues matter.

There is also a hard limitation. Much of the slope is heavily vegetated and difficult to access, which restricts inspection. The report warns there are likely to be more areas with high-risk characteristics than those that could be identified from the available viewpoints. That is why “nothing looks wrong today” is not a safety test.

Drainage is another thread that runs through the paperwork. The options report notes a drainage gully associated with The Vinery that appears to discharge surface runoff towards the cliff. While the authors do not pin the March 2024 slip directly on that outfall, they still flag it as a risk to the slope below. Paved paths can also channel rainwater to specific points rather than letting it disperse. Getting water away from the cliff edge is often as important as any steelwork.

The engineering options show what “making safe” means above a playground. One family of solutions uses soil nailing: steel bars drilled and grouted into the slope to reinforce it, usually paired with mesh or netting to hold the surface layer together. Draped netting is a heavy-duty net laid over the face to control small falls and reduce the energy of moving material. A king-post wall is a line of posts and panels intended to stop debris reaching the vulnerable area below. Another option uses a debris-flow barrier: a specialised net-and-post system designed to catch and absorb moving material.

None of these is a quick paint job. They require specialist access, careful sequencing, noise, and closure of affected areas while works take place. The options report also assumes the playground will remain where it is because there is not enough alternative space nearby. That assumption turns the problem into a duty: if you cannot relocate the people at risk, you must reduce the hazard.

Even the survey data carries a warning label. The report notes existing LiDAR — laser scanning used to map ground levels — lacked the resolution needed for detailed design on its own, and that a land-based topographical survey is required. That is not bureaucratic fussiness; it is the difference between guessing and building.

Works finally began on site on Monday 9 February 2026, with stabilisation intended to make the cliff safe before wider playground improvements can proceed. Progress matters, but residents also deserve plain-language updates: what has been built, what risks remain during works, and what will be monitored when the fences come down. And they deserve dates: when paths reopen, and when play resumes.

The finances, unusually for local government, can be followed in a straight line. In the council’s Cabinet report on the Leas landslides (report C/25/01, made public on 13 May 2025), officers said the cliff-stabilisation work would sit under capital code NJ44. A “capital code” is simply the council’s internal label for a specific investment project. The same section set out the funding mix: £150,000 as a capital allocation and £150,000 from the Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL) — a developer contribution that can be spent on infrastructure. Together, that was a £300,000 pot.

The procurement then appeared to match that envelope. The Find a Tender award notice for CAN Geotechnical shows a contract value of £250,000 excluding VAT. VAT is the 20 per cent tax added to most goods and services; on £250,000 it adds £50,000, producing £300,000 including VAT. So the headline award figure aligns neatly with the original set-aside.

Then the neatness breaks. In the council’s Q3 2025/26 General Fund capital monitoring, NJ44 (“Cliff Stabilisation Works”) is shown moving from an original budget of £300,000 to a latest approved budget of £400,000, with a projected outturn of £400,000. The same monitoring reports £29,000 of actual spend to date.

There may be a perfectly proper explanation: project budgets often cover more than the contractor’s bill, including surveys, design, supervision, access arrangements, safety management and reinstatement. But if the contract is, in effect, the “£300k job”, residents are entitled to ask one clear question: what exactly is the extra £100,000 paying for, and when was it approved? It also matters because timetables slipped. The May 2025 report talked about tendering in summer 2025 and starting in October. Crews did not mobilise until 9 February 2026. Delay can mean extra preliminaries, extended closures and higher professional fees before any stabilisation work starts.

Folkestone does not need drama; it needs grip. The cliff has already slipped once above a playground, after clear warning signs: cracking surfacing, leaning railings, and a path that had to be shut for safety. The reports explain, in plain terms, why this location is high stakes: children are exposed, storms are getting harsher, and parts of the slope cannot be inspected easily.

The council has now started the stabilisation works, and that is welcome. But confidence will depend on candour. Residents should not have to hunt through PDFs to understand what is being built, what it costs, and when it will finish. Publish a simple fortnightly update with dates, milestones, and the live budget against spend. Explain the extra £100,000 in one paragraph. And make the drainage story explicit.

If lessons are learned here, the wider Leas can be managed better. A safe playground should not require detective work.

NB: LIDRA /VSSA report was obtained under a freedom of information request by Stephen West, who runs the Protect & Preserve The Folkestone Leas Facebook Group.

The Shepway Vox Team

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